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Going Global: Individual Rights, Universal Norms and the Existence of 
an Overarching Normative Hierarchy in International Law 
 
Axelle Reiter-Korkmaz* 
 
I. The emergence of universal rules and the building of a new normative space in 
public international law 
 
The adoption of universal norms has revolutionised the conception of normativity at 
the international level. The traditional focus on a centralised regulatory authority is replaced 
by the idea of a spontaneous order, which progressively emerged from the decentralised 
actions of multiple agents. Indeed, the current international system is largely the result of a 
long process of codification or crystallisation of essentially customary rules, which have 
developed over time through the un-concerted acts posed at different levels by the various 
actors that compose the international community. It can be said that the international legal 
order is distinct in its absence of centralised law-making institutions; typically, all subjects of 
international law are able to participate in the elaboration of supra-national norms that will 
then bind them.1 In particular, the Charter of the United Nations and the various international 
human rights treaties adopted under its frame are the product of a liberal cosmopolitan vision 
of the world and of trans-national relations.  
 
The Charter of the United Nations is, in this respect, a truly revolutionary document. It 
endorses a complete shift -if not a reversal- in paradigm, from the traditional Westphalian to a 
clearly universalistic conception of international law.2 The regime it introduces relies on the 
existence of an international community, beyond and above the state. Membership in this new 
social entity, as well as its concerns and interests, are not restricted to that of the sole nation-
states. It is, on the contrary, composed of many diverse types of actors, including private 
individuals. In this view, the foundational role of the Charter could not be over-emphasised. It 
did not merely create one more legal order but established a set of rather novel institutions and 
                                                
* PhD researcher, European University Institute. 
1 P.-M. DUPUY, Droit international public, 8th ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2006, pp. 18-19. 
2 The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War, is at the origin of the modern concept of 
state sovereignty. It gives effect to the principle of territoriality and to the equality of sovereign states that hold 
absolute unchecked powers and exclusive control over their national territory, independent of their respective 
size and military strength. See: G. BERLIA, “Remarques sur la paix de Westphalie”, in Mélanges Basdevant, 
Paris, Pedone, 1960, pp. 35-42. 
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conferred a supra-national constitutional status to basic international norms and principles. Its 
implementation initiated a transforming process for the control mechanisms and the power 
dynamics at the global level. It has also been the origin of the concept of international public 
order and the international entrenchment of core normative values, shared by all humanity 
with an aim to protect each and every single human being against instances of aggression and 
abuse. 
 
Fundamentally, the Charter constitutes a radical switch of perspective in international 
relations, going from a state-centric to a truly cosmopolitan world order, and passing from 
unconstrained national sovereignty to a new international sovereignty. Following its adoption, 
the international legal order has become independent from states’ sovereign powers. Even 
though it was originally established by the expression of states’ assent, it progressively 
developed an ‘objective’ existence of its own. In view of this, the Charter is effectively 
analogous to an actual social contract; thus, providing legitimacy for a universal legal order 
and its institutions.3 It is a remarkably concrete achievement. Contrasting in that the tacit or 
hypothetical variants of the social contract theory, sometimes put forward at the national level 
in an attempt to justify coercive institutions, the international system is grounded in a real 
constitutive legal document, which effectively binds the parties to this agreement. This 
implies that the transfer of competences from the domestic to the supra-national level and the 
ensuing devolution of traditional state-owned prerogatives to the international community are 
irreversible. In this regard, attention should be paid to the distinctive nature and scope of the 
United Nations’ Charter. As the founding text of this organisation, it applies immediately and 
without exceptions or reservations to all its members. This means that it obliges the quasi-
totality of states worldwide to abide by its provisions, including those protecting individual 
rights and interests.  
 
This point is particularly important and, as such, cannot be ignored when analysing or 
interpreting the content and application of contemporary rules of international law. In 
particular, it should always be kept in mind in the context of human rights and humanitarian 
dispositions, which constitute the keystone of the Charter.4 In fact, the Charter completely 
reverses the values on which the international society is founded by freeing individuals from 
                                                
3 P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, Cours général de droit international public, Recueil 
des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, 2002, Vol. 297, pp. 9-489; Leiden Nijhoff, 2003, at 
pp. 204, 220-221 and 412. 
4 See: UN Charter, Preamble; which posits peace and human rights as the main aims of the organisation. 
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states’ almighty power, conferring to them inalienable rights, irrespective of their ethnicity, 
background and sex, and prioritising them by opposition to governments now bound to 
guarantee those rights.5 As a result, the unity of the contemporary international system is less 
organic than substantive. It is based on the hierarchy of norms that ensues from the 
recognition, in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of the 
notion of ius cogens; a legal concept itself derived from the higher rank assigned to the basic 
principles entrenched in the Charter. These peremptory rules, which are by their legal status 
placed above the will of the states and outside the scope of treaties’ control, constitute the core 
of an emerging concept of international public order. In a word, ius cogens norms are at the 
origin of a new type of normative space, of sovereignty, and of constitutionality.    
 
In this perspective, international institutions have a mandate to guarantee the respect of 
the international public order and implement the rules of ius cogens; chiefly, the non-
aggression principle and the rules protecting fundamental rights and liberties (both in times of 
peace and of war), which are themselves an inter-individual application of this principle. In 
this regard, one cannot ignore that the protection of human rights in the United Nations 
system is linked to broader issues of peace and security,6 and that the core of absolutely 
inalienable entitlements is composed of precisely those rights most connected to such 
questions. While this is surely partly due to the original function and nature of the United 
Nations as an organisation, it also links individual liberties to a generalised application of the 
principle of non-aggression, be it among states, communities, private entities or individuals. 
This all-encompassing principle of non-aggression, then, constitutes the foundation on which 
the entire international edifice is built. 
 
The supervisory and guarantor role conferred specifically to supra-national institutions 
and more loosely to the international community as a whole in relation to peremptory rules of 
international law implies that, in cases of violations of these norms, they are empowered to 
punish the offenders. Besides, the creation and progressive extension of international 
mechanisms of supervision reinforces the ban on domestic abuses of these rules. And the 
                                                
5 P.-M. DUPUY, “L’individu et le droit international: Théorie des droits de l’homme et fondements du droit 
international”, Archives de philosophie du droit, 1987, pp. 119-133, at p. 121. 
6 See, more generally, on the crucial place of war and peace considerations in contemporary international law: 
P.-M. DUPUY, “L’enfer et le paradigme: Libres propos sur les relations du droit international avec la 
persistance des guerres et l’objectif idéal du maintien de la paix”, in Mélanges H. Thierry, Paris, Pedone, 1998, 
pp. 187-201. 
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recognition of the existence of an ‘actio popularis’7 against such breaches, open to all 
components of the international community, significantly enhances their protection. 
Furthermore, it entails that state sovereignty is legally restricted by the respect of ius cogens. 
Such a model conflicts eventually with republican or majoritarian notions about governmental 
functions and democracy, which are essentially state-centred rather than universalistic. It also 
clashes irreconcilably with realist views of international relations, which assert 
uncompromisingly the prevalence of uninhibited state sovereignty and prerogatives. 
Ultimately, it is built on the primacy of the individual over the community and the polity and, 
consequently, promotes the protection of human rights against states’ overriding power. 
Finally, it rests on the belief that the recognition of a common humanity can only pass by that 
of each of its members. 
 
Whereas this double process of organic de-centralisation and substantive unification of 
the law, and even the mere existence of the notion of ius cogens, have been contested until 
recently, the detractors of such a line of argumentation fail to appreciate the complexity of the 
international system taken as a whole, and its progressive move away from the traditional 
state-centric Westphalian model since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. In 
particular, even though ius cogens is sometimes relied on for purely instrumental or strategic 
purposes, one should not forget that -far from constituting “a ‘legal word’ devoid of any 
coherent meaning”- it remains an important concept of positive law,8 as well as the key stone 
of the international legal order. Hence, the mere fact that it incorporates values of a mostly 
ethical nature into the fabric of the law does not give reason to refute its crucial position and 
function in the development of the supra-national system. In view of this, it is important to 
look both at its contents and its place in the evolution of general international law, in order to 
fully appreciate the paradigm shift it creates inside the concept of normative order and the 
consequences for the architecture of a worldwide global regime.  
 
This paper attempts to do this in light of the role played by human rights, as the most 
archetypical example of integral norms, in the creation of this new vision of normativity. The 
                                                
7 The notion of ‘actio popularis’ has its origins in Roman law and refers to legal actions brought in front of a 
tribunal in vindication of the general interest. 
See: I.C.J., South West Africa, Second Phase, 18 July 1966, p. 47, § 88. 
M. RAGAZZI, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford, Clarendon, 1997, p. 210. 
8 P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 28-33, 207-213, 269-313 and 414-427. 
P.-M. DUPUY, “Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A 
Response to Martti Koskenniemi”, European Journal of International Law, 2005, pp. 131-137, at p. 136. 
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specific focus is motivated by the position occupied by fundamental rights in the general 
structure of the international system. The progressive entrenchment of human rights, through 
the recognition of their peremptory status, as the centre of the international public order is 
challenging the traditional concept of state sovereignty, and replacing it by a new form of 
international sovereignty of an intrinsically liberal nature. The duties that international human 
rights law creates for states are not only owed to the protected individuals and legal persons. 
Because they make up a crucial part of the international public order and are defined as 
superior interests of the international community, they can be sanctioned by the entire 
international community. Subsequently, they are insulated from states’ obsession with 
national sovereignty and governmental attempts to reduce them. States’ duty to respect them 
exists, regardless of their ratification of the relevant treaties, derived instead directly from 
membership and participation in the international society. In consequence, they ground the 
contemporary evolution and integration of general public international law along the lines of a 
new global normativity, ultimately based on a universal recognition of the humanity of every 
individual. 
 
II. The object of international human rights law and the creation of a new vision 
of normativity 
 
In order to fully understand and elucidate the complexities and technicalities of a legal 
norm, one must analyse it in the light of its ultimate aim and social function.9 This explains 
the insertion, by Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of the 
famous ‘object and purpose’ test -which states that “a treaty shall be interpreted […] in the 
light of its object and purpose”- into the theory of interpretation of international agreements. 
Accordingly, the idea lying at the core of any international instrument ought to be insulated 
from adverse attacks and teleological considerations can never be ignored, even in the frame 
of a thoroughly descriptive account of the law. More precisely, when a certain ideology 
presided to the creation of a given set of norms, it cannot be dismissed altogether. It 
undoubtedly was the case for human rights conventions and, to a lesser extent, for the Charter 
of the United Nations; a fact which cannot be neglected. This implies that, even when looking 
at their specific provisions, the original aim and theoretical structure underlying the whole 
human rights project should not be forgotten.  
                                                
9 P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., p. 27. 
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The object and purpose of international human rights and humanitarian law is neither 
to establish reciprocal rights and obligations between states for their mutual benefit nor to 
organise a legal frame for their contractual relations. It does not aim at forwarding national 
interests or at adjudicating the conflicting claims, disagreements and ambitions of differing 
governments. On the contrary, human rights and humanitarian conventions are multilateral 
legal agreements composed of a set of ‘absolute’, objective or ‘self-existent’ obligations that 
states parties unilaterally commit themselves to comply with.10 Hence, they constitute 
‘integral’ treaties, by opposition to ‘interdependent’, reciprocal, ‘concessionary’ or 
synallagmatiques conventions. In other words, they are disconnected from the idea of 
reciprocity that traditionally tainted most international accords. And they generate obligations 
that depend neither legally nor practically on their parallel execution by other parties to the 
same agreement. In contrast, they give rise to autonomously and absolutely binding duties, 
owed to the entire world rather than merely to the contracting parties.11 This means that, when 
they ratify those treaties, members of the international community undertake to respect and 
guarantee the individual rights they protect, regardless of the actions of other states.  
 
This constitutes the uniqueness of this type of treaty in comparison with other 
international instruments. And it has been alleged to justify at least some departure from the 
classical secondary rules of general international law.12 However, the recognition of this 
specificity and of the ensuing exceptional treatment of human rights issues, in key 
international agreements codifying secondary international norms, shows that the application 
of different solutions to human rights issues is actually in conformity with the said norms. For 
example, Article 60 § 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifies that a 
                                                
10 E.C.H.R., Ireland v. UK [Northern Ireland Case], 18 Jan. 1978, Series A, Vol. 25, p. 90, § 239.  
E.Com.H.R., Austria v. Italy [Admissibility], 11 Jan. 1961, Y.E.C.H.R., Vol. 4, pp. 116-183, at pp. 138-140. 
A.C.H.R., Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru [Competence], 24 Sept. 1999, Series C, Vol. 54, § 42. 
A.C.H.R., Aguirre Roca et al. v. Peru [Competence], 24 Sept. 1999, Series C, Vol. 55, § 41. 
I.C.J., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Pleadings, 
Reports, 1951, pp. 387-ff. 
O. DE FROUVILLE, L’intangibilité des droits de l’homme en droit international, Paris, Pedone, 2004, pp. 505 
and 507; who underlines that states never contested this.  
11 See, for a detailed analysis of this phenomenon and its relevance for human rights and humanitarian law:  
P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 139-141 and 382, note 763. 
G. FITZMAURICE, “Second Report on the Law of Treaties”, Yearbook of the ILC, 1957, Vol. II, p. 54. 
12 R. BERNHARDT, “Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties”, in Mélanges Wiarda, Köln, 
Heymanns, 1988, pp. 65-71, at pp. 65-66. 
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material breach of such a treaty does not result in its suspension or its termination.13 Similarly, 
it would never justify comparable violations of its provisions (even) regarding nationals of the 
infringing state. Indeed, the duties undertaken are due -by all subjects of international law- to 
the international community at large and do not cease to exist simply because of one country’s 
failure to comply with them. This is the essence of integral obligations. 
 
In addition, states parties to these instruments do not merely engage themselves to 
guarantee the freedom of fellow member states’ citizens. They vouch to protect the individual 
rights of every person residing on their territory or within their jurisdiction, independent of her 
nationality and origins,14 which includes ‘illegal’ immigrants.15 For example, Article 1 of the 
European Convention demands that states “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined”. This covers all persons effectively under their power, be them 
nationals of the controlling authority or subjects of other (non-)signatory states. So, human 
rights norms refer to the universal identity of human beings.16 And the basic underlying idea is 
to treat every person as a human being,17 a rule that does not admit any exception. This idea is 
already expressed in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration, which declares that “everyone is 
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
declaration can be fully realised”. It binds all public institutions at the global, trans-national, 
municipal and local levels, to protect the said entitlements and provide a frame in which 
individuals can freely exercise their liberties.  
                                                
13 See: E. SCHWELB, “The Law of Treaties and Human rights”, in Mélanges Mc Dougal, New York, Free 
Press, 1976, pp. 262-290, at pp. 278-281; who defends that this disposition should be read in the light of the sixth 
paragraph of its preamble, which points out its coverage of all human rights and humanitarian treaties.  
14 E.C.H.R., Ireland v. UK [Northern Ireland Case], 18 Jan. 1978, Series A, Vol. 25, p. 90, § 239.  
E.Com.H.R., Austria v. Italy [Admissibility], 11 Jan. 1961, Y.E.C.H.R., Vol. 4, pp. 116-183, at pp. 138-140. 
E.Com.H.R., Temeltasch v. Switzerland, 5 May 1982, D.R., Vol. 31, pp. 120-152, §§ 63-64. 
H.R. Committee, General Comment No 15 (27) on the Position of Aliens under the Covenant, 22 July 1986, § 1. 
H.R. Committee, General Comment No 24 (52) on Issues relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or 
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to Declarations under Article 41 of 
the Covenant, 2 Nov. 1994, § 17. 
A.C.H.R., Effects of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention, Adv. Op. OC-2/82, 
1982, Series A, Vol. 2, §§ 29 and 33. 
15 A.C.H.R., Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Adv. Op. OC-18/03, 17 Sept. 2003, Series A, 
Vol. 18, §§ 106-107, 111-160, 169-172 and 173 (6-11). 
16 P.-M. DUPUY, Droit international public, 8th ed., o.c., p. 214. 
17 N.A. BUTENSCHON, “Citizenship and Human Rights: Some Thoughts on a Complex Relationship”, in 
Mélanges Eide, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2003, p. 555-570, at p. 556-557. 
P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 36, 104, 257-258, 414-415 and 488-489. 
A. RODRIGUES, “Apport de la pratique du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie à la protection 
des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine”, in Mélanges Cassese, The Hague, Kluwer, 2003, pp. 791-826, 
at p. 794, especially note 10. 
B. SIMMA, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie 
de Droit International de La Haye, 1994, Vol. 250, pp. 217-384, at p. 242. 
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Essentially, international human rights law constitutes the personal rights of each and 
every individual into universal absolute obligations that the international community owes to 
her because of her humanity. As a result, one can say that international human rights law 
stands as a legal order of a quasi-constitutional type. This reinforces the logical primacy of 
supra-national human rights norms over contradictory rules which are part of the national 
legal order, even though domestic authorities are usually charged with the enforcement of 
those international dispositions.18 The European Court and Commission of Human Rights 
have expressly recognised this and underlined the European constitutional value of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in several instances, specifying that this treaty is “a 
constitutional instrument of European public order”.19 This is equally valid at the universal 
level,20 where the Universal Declaration is seen as a “part of the constitutional structure of the 
world community”, together with the Charter of the United Nations.21 Hence, the international 
bill of rights “may, by finally constituting the individual as a subject of the international 
commonwealth, prove to be the first decisive step in the evolution of the federation of the 
world”.22 More radically, the recent international sovereignty ultimately takes its roots in an 
inalienable liberal right to liberty and self-determination of all individuals. 
 
Aside from the Charter, the development of human rights norms and the creation of 
new trans-national institutions further consecrate the evolution “away from the classic regime 
of state sovereignty […] toward the firm entrenchment of the liberal regime of international 
sovereignty”.23 Accordingly, the system of inter-states complaints obligatory under Article 24 
                                                
18 F. RIGAUX, “Logique et droits de l’homme”, in Mélanges Ryssdal, Koln, Heymanns, 2000, pp. 1197-1211, 
at pp. 1198-1199. 
19 E.C.H.R., Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 29 Oct. 1992, Series A, Vol. 246-A, §§ 68-69. 
E.C.H.R., Loizidou v. Turkey [Preliminary Objections], 23 Mar. 1995, Series A, Vol. 310, §§ 75 and 93. 
E.C.H.R., Matthews v. UK, 18 Feb. 1999, Reports, 1999, I, § 49. 
E.Com.H.R., Chrysostomos, Loizidou et al. v. Turkey, 4 Mar. 1991, Y.E.C.H.R., Vol. 34, pp. 35-ff., p. 52. 
20 E. SCHWELB, “The Law of Treaties and Human rights”, o.c., p. 275. 
21 L.B. SOHN, “The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than States”, 
American University Law Review, 1982, pp. 1-64, at pp. 16-17.  
22 H. LAUTERPACHT, “The International Protection of Human Rights”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International de La Haye, 1947, Vol. 70, pp. 1-108, at p. 105. 
See also, on the strong connection between human rights instruments and the emergence of  a global community: 
O. DE FROUVILLE, L’intangibilité des droits de l’homme en droit international, o.c., p. 266. 
R.-J. DUPUY, “L’universalité des droits de l’homme”, in Mélanges Sperduti, Milan, Giuffrè, 1984, pp. 539-
556, at pp. 543-544. 
23 D. HELD, “Violence, Law, and Justice in a Global Age”, in C. CALHOUN, P. PRICE and A. TIMMER, 
Understanding September 11, New York, New Press, 2002, pp. 92-105, at p. 94. 
See also: D. HELD, “Laws of States, Laws of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty”, Legal Theory, 2002,  
pp. 1-44, at p. 2. 
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of the European Convention on Human Rights24 is considered as a remedy against a breach of 
Europe’s public order. The same applies to the optional systems of inter-states requests under 
Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 45 of the 
Inter-American Convention. It is the case especially for the latter, since the Inter-American 
Court endorsed the very same approach to this issue as its European counter-part and referred 
extensively to Strasbourg case law in doing so.25 By definition, inter-states complaints 
mechanisms embody the very idea that “how a government treats its own citizens is no longer 
its exclusive business, but a matter of legitimate concern for other states” and their individual 
inhabitants.26 
 
The International Court of Justice has adopted similar views on the place of human 
rights conventions in the international system. It first stressed the “common interest” 
underlying this type of treaties in its advisory opinion regarding reservations to the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.27 And it confirmed, 
in the Barcelona Traction Case, that human rights obligations are erga omnes “obligations of 
a state towards the international community as a whole” -namely, obligations whose 
fulfilment can validly be claimed by every member of that community, independent of any 
particular agreement relative to the issue in hand- and that, subsequently, all states have the 
same legal interest in their protection;28 an interest that is closely tied to the principle of 
legality and the respect of the rule of law at the international level.29 International human 
rights law is undeniably contributing to the emergence of “a new legal order, which 
encompasses a notion of international society”;30 as well as to the materialisation of an 
                                                
24 European Convention on Human rights, new Article 33. 
25 A.C.H.R., Effects of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention, 1982, Adv. Op. OC-
2/82, 1982, Series A, Vol. 2, §§ 29-30; which paraphrases the European Commission of Human Rights. 
26 A. INGRAM, A Political Theory of Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 12. 
P. SIEGHART, The Lawful Rights of Mankind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, preface, p. vii. 
27 I.C.J., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adv. Op., 
28 May 1951. 
28 I.C.J., Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, 5 Feb. 1970, p. 32, § 33. 
29 P.-M. DUPUY, Droit international public, 8th ed., o.c., p. 243. 
P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., p. 359. 
30 T.M. FRANCK, “Democracy as a Human Right”, in J.L. HARGROVE and L. HENKIN, Human Rights: 
An Agenda for the Next Century, Washington, American Society of International Law, 1994, pp. 73-101, at p. 89. 
A.C. KISS, “La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme a-t-elle créé un ordre juridique autonome?”, in 
Mélanges Pettiti, Brussels, Bruylant, 1998, pp. 493-505, at p. 494. 
J. KOLASA, “Rules on Emergency Powers in International Human Rights Treaties”, in Council of Europe, 
European Commission for Democracy through Law, Human Rights and the Functioning of the Democratic 
Institutions in Emergency Situations, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1997, pp. 108-128, at p. 110. 
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“international civil society” able to claim respect for the rights of its individual components.31 
 
This position has been clearly defended by Roberto Ago, who considers that the idea 
of erga omnes obligations is narrowly bound to the existence of an international community 
and the institutionalisation of such a community.32 Due to his key role in the International Law 
Commission during the early codification of the project on states’ international responsibility, 
his views on the question have been very influential on the ulterior work of the Commission. 
As a result, the International Law Commission has endorsed a similar approach in its recent 
codification of the responsibility of states for the violation of peremptory norms of 
international law. 
 
III. The International Law Commission codification of states international 
liability as a consecration of this new conception of normativity 
 
The need to protect fundamental freedoms and entitlements has strongly influenced the 
writing of the 2001 final Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts,33 later annexed to a resolution of the General Assembly.34 In addition, this 
project largely contributes to the crystallisation of several innovative tendencies regarding 
international human rights law and to the entrenchment of a novel approach to normativity at 
the international level. 
 
First of all, the Draft Articles foresee two distinct sources of states’ responsibility. On 
one side, Article 42 (b) (ii) of this document deals only with the question of inter-dependent 
obligations and thus with the “invocation of the responsibility” by a state which has been 
personally injured, as is anyhow mentioned in the title of this disposition. Contrasting this 
provision, Article 48 institutes an actio popularis to the benefit of associations of states and 
the international community. So, its application is not conditioned by a personal lesion of the 
                                                
31 P.-M. DUPUY, “Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values”, 
o.c., p. 137. 
32 R. AGO, “Obligations Erga Omnes and the International Community”, in A. CASSESE et al., International 
Crimes of States, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989, pp. 237-239, at p. 238. 
R. AGO, “The International Community and International Organizations”, in R.-J. DUPUY, Handbook on 
International Organizations, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988, pp. 3-12. 
33 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, UN Doc., A/CN.4/L.620/Rev.1.  
34 UN General Assembly, Resolution 56/83, 12 Dec. 2001, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, UN Doc., A/RES/56/83. 
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state that brings it into play. Article 48 § 1 refers to two groups of integral obligations: those 
“owed to a group of states including that state” which is invoking the responsibility of 
another, like duties towards a regional organisation; and those “owed to the international 
community as a whole”. These two types of rules are objective obligations, which do not 
engage any notion of reciprocity and are never “of such a character as radically to change the 
position of all other states to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further 
performance of the obligation”.  
 
Article 48 § 1 (a) protects the interests of regional organisations or of other states’ 
groupings, in as much as they differ from the interests of their members. For instance, each 
member state of the European Union could invoke, in place of the European Commission, the 
responsibility of another state -irrespective of its belonging or not to the union-, for the 
violation of the duties it owes to the European institutions. The same applies to states 
belonging to the Council of Europe or the Organisation of American States, which constitutes 
recognition of the mechanism of inter-state applications existing inside these two institutions. 
Thereby, Article 48 § 1 (a) allows a sort of narrow actio popularis in relation to the protection 
of the object and interests of international organisations. And it de facto gives them a certain 
form of international legal personality.  
 
But Article 48 § 1 (b) goes much further, as it permits any state to intervene in the 
event of a breach of erga omnes obligations. Every government may then ask for the cessation 
of any infraction to these norms and the reparation of the violation on behalf of the victim. 
Article 48 § 1 (b) confirms thereby the position of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, which considers that such obligations are “owed towards all the other 
members of the international community, each of which then has a correlative right”. And it 
equally endorses the Tribunal’s judgement that their violation “simultaneously constitutes a 
breach of the correlative right of all members of the international community and gives rise to 
a claim for compliance accruing to each and every member, which then has the right to insist 
on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case to call for the breach to be discontinued”.35  
 
This constitutes the foundation for a multilateral frame, where the notion of reciprocity 
is diluted and an authentic actio popularis is open to all states, aimed at the protection of the 
                                                
35 I.C.T.Y., Furundzija Case (Lasva Valley), IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 10 Dec. 1998, § 151. 
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international public order.36 This prevalence of objective interests over subjective ones serves 
the function of restoring international legality, even in the cases where the wronged state is a 
small powerless country without enough weight on the international scene, and which will not 
challenge a stronger nation in fear of retaliation. Although Article 48 § 3 refers to Article 45 -
regarding the “loss of the right to invoke responsibility”-, which prevents any state to invoke 
the responsibility of another when “the injured state has validly waived the claim”, states 
cannot validly renounce to a request grounded on the lack of respect of peremptory 
obligations. In truth, they are not allowed to derogate from these norms even by means of 
agreement or treaty. So, it seems that they could not possibly acquiesce validly to violations of 
erga omnes obligations either, as these similarly guarantee superior interests of the 
international community.37 
 
Secondly, Articles 25 § 1 (b), 33 § 1, 42 (b) and 48 § 1 (b) of the Draft Articles do not 
speak of an ‘international community of states’ but of the ‘international community as a 
whole’, which extends the scope of this concept to cover non-state actors.38 Moreover, 
according to Article 48 § 2 (b), public authorities introducing an action on the basis of Article 
48 § 1 can require the responsible government to repair the damage caused to the injured state 
or “the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”. This alinea implies that they can defend on 
this ground not only the interests of other states, but also those of private entities or 
individuals. This second aspect of the actio popularis, which is already tacitly expressed in 
Article 48 § 2 (b), is confirmed by the mention in Article 39 of the contribution to the injury 
“of the injured state or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought”. Besides, 
the direct victims of infractions to erga omnes obligations -as those of breaches of peremptory 
norms of international law- are rarely states and usually private individuals.  
 
                                                
36 See, for hints at such a result:  
A. PELLET, “Le nouveau projet de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’état pour fait internationalement illicite: 
Requiem pour le crime?”, in Mélanges Cassese, o.c., pp. 655-683, at pp. 660 and 682. 
37 See, for a defence of the inapplicability of Article 45 to the circumstances of Article 48 § 1 (b): 
A. GATTINI, “The Obligations of States Likely to Invoke the Responsibility for Serious Breaches of 
International Peremptory Norms”, in P.-M. DUPUY, Workshop on Breaches of Obligations under Peremptory 
Norms of General International Law and the International Responsibility of States, Florence, European 
University Institute, 2001, Section III - 4. 
A. PELLET, “Le nouveau projet de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’état pour fait internationalement illicite”, 
o.c., pp. 673-674. 
38 A. PELLET, “Le nouveau projet de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’état pour fait internationalement illicite”, 
o.c., p. 666; who is critical of the wording of these articles but still observes, in this regard, that the notion of 
international community has expanded since the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
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Subsequently, any state can use the actio popularis consecrated in Article 48 to oppose 
and sanction violations of erga omnes obligations to the benefit of individuals who are not its 
own nationals or residents and, in particular, breaches of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
that the offending state is bound to respect under treaties it has signed or customary 
international law. This corollary is corroborated by the absence of application of the clause 
inserted in Article 44 (a) -on the “admissibility of claims”- to human rights norms, an 
inapplicability which has been explicitly underlined during the debates of the International 
Law Commission.39 Article 44 (a) otherwise stipulates that “the responsibility of a state may 
not be invoked if the claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating to 
the nationality of claims”. Its exclusion in matters related to the protection of individual 
entitlements further derives from the fact that what has already been said in relation to the 
waiving of states’ responsibility under Article 45 and erga omnes obligations is equally valid 
for Article 44.40 This institutionalises a universal system of inter-states applications 
comparable to the one recognised by the Council of Europe and the Organisation of American 
States. The next step on this line would involve granting the same right of action to 
individuals or other non-state actors, a development that is already observable in the 
increasing precedence given to the rights and interests of victims in international criminal law. 
 
Thirdly, the Draft Articles confer the status of ius cogens to the whole set of human 
rights. Indeed, the project adopted on second reading in 2001 mixes the notions of erga omnes 
obligations and ius cogens. It uses them alternatively, substituting one for the other. The third 
chapter of the second part of the Draft is titled “serious breaches of obligations under 
peremptory norms of general international law”. Articles 40 and 41, which are included in the 
said chapter, refer to this very concept; and so does Article 26. By opposition, the first chapter 
of the third part speaks of obligations owed to the international community or erga omnes 
obligations,41 as the texts previously adopted. The switch from one term to the other in 
different dispositions as well as in successive versions of the same provisions consecrates the 
exact correspondence that exists between the two concepts, in conformity with the definition 
of ius cogens in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention.42 Moreover, the International Law 
Commission has interchangeably made use of both expressions during its debates and justifies 
                                                
39 International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its 52nd Session, 2000, UN Doc., A/55/10, § 422.  
40 A. GATTINI, “The Obligations of States Likely to Invoke the Responsibility for Serious Breaches of 
International Peremptory Norms”, o.c., Section III - 3. 
41 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, o.c., Articles 42 § 1 (b) and 48 § 1 (b). 
42 P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 256 and 366. 
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the resulting confusion by alleging that the obligations arising under these two types of norms 
largely coincide.43 Consequently, the norms protecting fundamental freedoms, whose erga 
omnes character is traditionally recognised, also benefit from the status of peremptory 
obligations or ius cogens.  
 
Even so, one might argue that the mix-up of the two terms in the Draft Articles results 
from an over-simplification of reality and not from a conscious decision to extend the scope of 
ius cogens to cover all erga omnes obligations. However, the Draft does not solely confuse the 
two notions, and use them in an overlapping fashion. It goes much further in that direction, 
with the result that the perfect compatibility and equalisation of both terms cannot be denied 
so easily. 
 
To begin with, it explicitly refers to the peremptory status of individual rights in its 
Article 50 § 1, concerning the “obligations not affected by countermeasures”; specifying that 
“countermeasures shall not affect: the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; obligations for the protection of fundamental 
human rights; obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; [and] other 
obligations under peremptory norms of general international law”. This disposition mirrors 
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, which exempt “treaties of a humanitarian character” 
from being suspended or terminated as a result of violations of their provisions by states 
parties to these treaties. Although it leaves the door open for potential new candidates to that 
status, it expressly recognises the ius cogens or peremptory character of the three first 
categories of obligations it cites, including the protection of human rights.  
 
Here again, one might claim that the mentioned rights are solely the most important 
ones or those belonging to the hardcore of non-derogable provisions, which cannot be 
restricted even in times of war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation. On one 
hand, it can be formally argued that all rights that cannot be suspended under these safety 
clauses have by definition ius cogens status. Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties expressly singles out peremptory norms of general international law as rules 
                                                
43 J. CRAWFORD, Third Report on the Responsibility of States, UN Doc., A/CN.4/507/Add.4, §§ 372-374. 
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its 53rd Session, 2001, UN Doc., A/56/10, § 7. 
B. SIMMA, “Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State Responsibility”, in Mélanges Rosenne, 
Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 821-ff., at p. 825; who judges that the two terms refer to different aspects of the 
same norms, that they “constitute but the two sides of one and the same coin”. 
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“from which no derogation is permitted”. Thus, peremptoriness can be considered as a 
synonym for inalienability.44 As a result, the human rights specifically identified in 
international treaties to remain always inalienable -independent of the gravity of the 
circumstances- belong essentially to this category.45 On the other hand, nothing indicates that 
Article 53 merely covers this particular category of individual freedoms and entitlements. And 
it is still improbable that the expression “fundamental human rights” in Article 50 § 1 of the 
Draft Articles would only refer to the few rights listed in derogation clauses.  
 
On the contrary, it seems that this expression needs to be interpreted much more 
broadly, as it is done in the title of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Indeed, in its famous obiter dictum in the Barcelona 
Traction Case, the International Court of Justice uses the quasi-identical expression of “basic 
rights of the human person” in relation to the concept of erga omnes obligations. The 
similitude is even more flagrant in the French version of the judgement, which speaks of 
“droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine”.46 Besides, all the international rules 
protecting human rights are applicable erga omnes. And the dictum of the Court has been 
interpreted as a reference to the two United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, before these instruments had even entered into 
force.47  
 
In addition, a distinction among the different human rights cannot be justified at this 
level, neither on a theoretical basis nor by reference to the practice of international bodies 
monitoring the respect of individual rights and freedoms.48 Finally, the deliberations during 
the Vienna Conference regarding the parallel Article 60 of the Vienna Convention referred not 
only to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but also to the status and protection of refugees, the 
prohibition of slavery, the interdiction of genocide and, ultimately, to the “conventions for the 
protection of human rights in general”.49 Article 50 § 1 pertains, therefore, to the customary 
                                                
44 P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 274 and 276. 
45 P.-M. DUPUY, Droit international public, 8th ed., o.c., p. 235.  
M.N. SHAW, “Genocide and International Law”, in Mélanges Rosenne, o.c., pp. 797-820, at p. 801. 
46 I.C.J., Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, 5 Feb. 1970, pp. 32 and 47, §§ 33-34 and 91. 
47 A. DE HOOGH, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes, The Hague, Kluwer, 1996, p. 52. 
International Law Institute, “Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-
Intervention in Internal Affairs of States”, Yearbook of the International Law Institute, 1990, Vol. II, p. 341-ff.  
N.H.B. JORGENSEN, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 95. 
48 Y. DINSTEIN, “The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights”, o.c., p. 17. 
49 H. MOSLER, The International Society as a Legal Community, Alphen, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980, p. 63. 
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parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all the dispositions of the two 
International Covenants, as well as to the other international treaties protecting human rights 
at the global level.  
 
IV. The position of international human rights norms at the core of this new 
conception of normativity 
 
The confusion introduced between the notions of ius cogens and erga omnes 
obligations and the recognition of the peremptory character of all human rights in the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts are a crystallisation 
of recent doctrinal developments on the topic.50 The “futility” of trying to draw a distinction 
between the two concepts is clearly evidenced by the observation that “authors have 
sometimes come to opposite conclusions as to the larger or narrower scope of either”.51 More 
crucially, the International Court of Justice appears to have paved the way to the International 
Law Commission in failing to differentiate noticeably the two concepts.52 And, fundamentally, 
it is equally implied in the analytical description and clarification of both concepts, underlying 
the doctrinal definitions. 
 
The rules of ius cogens have been compared to domestic rules of public policy or 
public order.53 Indeed, ius cogens -whose origins are generally traced to Roman Law- is seen 
as an embodiment of the principle that “certain types of contract are, by their very nature, 
injurious to society and therefore contrary to public policy”.54 It incorporates a notion of 
international public order or “public order of the international community”, composed of 
international rules and principles which cannot be impaired by the invocation of contrary 
                                                                                                                                                   
E. SCHWELB, “The Law of Treaties and Human rights”, o.c., pp. 274-275. 
50 See, among others, for a clear doctrinal endorsement of the confusion between the two notions: 
B. SIMMA, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law”, o.c., pp. 292-294 and 299-300; 
who remarks that, although some norms could theoretically be applicable erga omnes without having a 
peremptory character, examples of such rules appears practically speaking difficult to conceive.  
51 C. TOMUSCHAT, “Reconceptualizing the Debate on Ius Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, in J.M. 
THOUVENIN and C. TOMUSCHAT, The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Ius Cogens 
and Obligations Erga Omnes, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2006, pp. 425-436, at pp. 425 and 429-430. 
52 I.C.J., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Preliminary Objections, 11 July 1996, § 31. 
53 P.M. DUPUY, Droit international public, 8th ed., o.c., pp. 21 and 294-297. 
P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 280-282. 
D.J. HARRIS, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1998, p. 836. 
H. LAUTERPACHT, “Report”, Yearbook of the ILC, 1953, Vol. II, p. 155. 
54 I. SINCLAIR, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1973, p. 110. 
L.S. SUNGA, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law, The Hague, Kluwer, 1997, p. 230. 
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multilateral agreements or unilateral actions. This entrenchment is motivated by the fact that 
any such attack would go against what constitutes the very foundation of public international 
law.55 Accordingly, it would even bind dissenting states,56 whether opposed to the concept as 
such or to its inclusion of some specific norms. Thereby, the notion of ius cogens participates 
to the transformation of the supra-national system into “universal international law”.57 Hence, 
it is introducing into the international legal order a source of objective illegality, which all 
states can invoke without being affected directly.58 Yet, this is precisely the meaning of erga 
omnes obligations and their main documented effect. Incidentally, the definition of 
peremptory norm in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention expressly refers to the notion of 
international community (even if it uses the old expression ‘international community of 
states’). The terminological confusion introduced by the International Law Commission 
would, then, correspond to a transcription of this analytical and the ensuing academic vision 
of ius cogens.  
 
In consequence, the Commission cannot be reproached its activism, since its Draft 
Articles merely embody an approach shared by a conceptual analysis of the relevant terms, the 
similar perception of a large segment of the doctrine, and a clear jurisprudential trend at the 
international level. For that reason, the ius cogens status of all human rights provisions ought 
to be currently assured and defended. On top of this, and independently of it, the peremptory 
character of the whole body of international human rights treaties and customs has also been 
advanced by part of the international case law and doctrine, although it has always been an 
object of controversy.  
 
                                                
55 I.-A.C.H.R., James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. United States, 22 Sept. 1987, 1986-1987 Annual 
Report, No 3/87, §§ 50-54. 
H. MOSLER, The International Society as a Legal Community, o.c., pp. 17-18. 
56 L.A. ALEXIDZE, “Legal Nature of Ius Cogens in Contemporary International Law”, pp. 246-247 and 258.  
M. BOS, A Methodology of International Law, p. 246.   
G. GAJA, “Ius Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention”, p. 283.  
R.S.J. Mc DONALD, “Fundamental Norms in Contemporary International Law”, p. 131. 
R.S.J. Mc DONALD, “The Character of the United Nations and the Development of Fundamental Principles of 
International Law”, p. 199. 
C.L. ROZAKIS, The Concept of Ius Cogens in the Law of Treaties, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1976, p. 78. 
57 M.C. BASSIOUNI, “The Philosophy and Policy of International Criminal Justice”, in Mélanges Cassese, o.c., 
pp. 65-126, at p. 68. 
J. CHARNEY, “Universal International Law”, American Journal of International Law, 1993, pp. 529-551. 
58 C.L. ROZAKIS, The Concept of Ius Cogens in the Law of Treaties, o.c., p. 24. 
L.S. SUNGA, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law, o.c., pp. 232-233. 
See also: A. VERDROSS, “Ius Dispositivum and Ius Cogens in International Law”, American Journal of 
International Law, 1966, pp. 55-ff., at p. 58; who underlines that ius cogens serves the needs of the international 
society as a whole, rather than those of particular member states. 
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On one side, some authors have contested the very notion of customary international 
peremptory norms,59 scepticism stemming from the lack of a clear consensus on the norms 
benefiting from this status. Yet, this lack of consensus is not enough in itself to cast doubts on 
the category as a whole.60 At least, many decisions of the International Court of Justice affirm 
the peremptory character of a number of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the 
jurisprudence of the majority of the International Court of Justice seems to restrict the scope 
of ius cogens to a limited number of rights and liberties: those considered non-derogable in all 
human rights instruments; the ban on genocide; the condemnation of crimes against humanity; 
and the basic principles of humanitarian law, which basically encompass similar norms, with 
the adjunction of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and the rule condemning 
the killing of prisoners of war. A notable addition to the traditional list of inalienable rights is 
that of the prohibition of discriminations based on grounds of race, colour, descent and 
national or ethnic origin.61 This jurisprudence seriously minimises the impact of peremptory 
provisions, in particular with respect to economic, social and cultural rights. In fact, it only 
adds to the lists of non-derogable rights inserted in all human rights conventions the need to 
respect fair trial guarantees and to care for the wounded and sick, as well as the ban of abusive 
deprivations of personal freedom and racial discriminations. 
 
Specifically, the proscription of the sole acts of discrimination which are based on 
race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin as a rule of ius cogens appears decidedly 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, it has now become highly contestable. In particular, excluding 
                                                
59 P. WEIL, Le droit international en quête de son identité, pp. 269-271. 
P. WEIL, “Towards a Relative Normativity in International Law”, pp. 423-442. 
K. WOLFKE, Custom in Present International Law, pp. 91-92. 
K. WOLFKE, “Ius Cogens in International Law”, pp. 145-162.  
60 ABI-SAAB, “Intervention”, in A. CASSESE and J.H.H. WEILER, Change and Stability in International 
Law-Making, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1988, p. 96. 
H. MOSLER, The International Society as a Legal Community, o.c., p. 19. 
L.S. SUNGA, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law, o.c., p. 233. 
61 I.C.J., Corfu Channel, Merits, 9 Apr. 1949, p. 22.  
I.C.J., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adv. Op., 
28 May 1951, p. 23. 
I.C.J., Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, 5 Feb. 1970, p. 32, § 34. 
I.C.J., Namibia Advisory Opinion, Adv. Op., 21 June 1971, p. 57, § 131. 
I.C.J., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Merits, 24 May 1980, pp. 42-43, § 91. 
I.C.J., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, 27 June 1986, pp. 112-114, 128-
130 and 147. 
I.C.J., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Request for 
the Indication of Provisional Measures, 8 Apr. 1993, p. 23, § 49. 
I.C.J., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Further 
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 13 Sept. 1993, p. 348, §§ 51-52. 
I.C.J., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Adv. Op., 8 July 1996, § 79. 
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gender equality from the core of non-derogable norms is truly problematic, considering the 
gravity of human rights violations resulting from discriminations against women. In addition, 
it neglects the fact that the United Nations Charter, whose dispositions are binding on all 
members of this organisation and thus on the quasi-totality of states, outlaws sex-based 
discriminations in several of its provisions.62 More generally, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has recently recognised, in an advisory opinion concerning the rights of 
‘illegal’ migrants to fair trial and adequate labour standards, the peremptory character of the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination taken as a whole. The Court specifies that “this 
principle may be considered peremptory under general international law, in as much as it 
applies to all states, whether or not they are party to a specific international treaty, and gives 
rise to effects with regard to third parties, including individuals”. And it justifies this 
judgement by the fact that “the whole legal structure of national and international public order 
rests on” the ban of any discrimination. As a result, it sums up that the “discriminatory 
treatment of any person, owing to gender, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political 
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic situation, 
property, civil status, birth or any other status is unacceptable”.63  
 
The exclusion of all economic and social rights from the list of peremptory 
international rules is equally upsetting. Yet, this conclusion was put into question by a 
decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
which declared that “most customary rules of international humanitarian law” are norms of ius 
cogens.64 In the light of the Tribunal’s views regarding the customary character of the biggest 
part of the laws and customs of war,65 this decision does, in turn, give a peremptory status to 
most provisions of the ius in bello. This largely extends the number of non-derogable 
individual freedoms and entitlements, including in the field of economic, social and cultural 
rights. 
 
                                                
62 UN Charter, Articles 1 § 3, 8, 13 § 1, 55, 56, 62 § 2 and 76. 
63 A.C.H.R., Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Adv. Op. OC-18/03, 17 Sept. 2003, Series A, 
Vol. 18, §§ 97-101 and 110. 
64 I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case (Prijedor), IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, § 143. 
A. CASSESE, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law”, in L. CONDORELLI et al., The United Nations and International 
Humanitarian Law, Paris, Pedone, 1996, pp. 229-247, at pp. 240-241. 
65 I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case (Prijedor), IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, §§ 96-137. 
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Furthermore, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities had to deal 
with the contents of international ius cogens in several decisions, in the context of the United 
Nations Security Council’s imposition upon all states members of that organisation to freeze 
the bank accounts of suspected terrorists. It, unfortunately, upheld the European anti-terrorism 
measures adopted in application of the mentioned Security Council resolutions. However, it 
did not stop its analysis there. In the process of reaching its verdict, it judged that it cannot 
review the legality of such resolutions, beyond their conformity with peremptory norms of 
international law, and went on to examine the scope of such a category of rules. During the 
subsequent investigation of this question, it recognised that the protection of private property, 
the entitlement to a fair hearing and the access to an effective judicial remedy are part of the 
core human rights provisions benefiting from ius cogens status, even though it only sanctions 
arbitrary deprivations of these liberties.66 In view of the fact that international organs have the 
tendency to concede a lesser ranking in the rights hierarchy to individual property than to 
most other human rights, this shows a marked tendency in favour of recognising such a 
character to all individual freedoms and entitlements. 
 
On the other side, it has been suggested that all the norms of humanitarian law and the 
treaties protecting human rights universally ought to be judged as imperative provisions.67 For 
instance, the Human Rights Committee underlines the peremptory character of a great number 
of rights.68 The Inter-American Commission also recognises the ius cogens status of 
fundamental freedoms and entitlements69 and affirms, along the same lines, but with a more 
specific focus on applicable regional instruments, that the entire American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man is “a mandatory rule of ius cogens”.70  
 
The Japanese judge Tanaka adopts a similar position in his famous dissenting opinion 
before the International Court of Justice, in the African South West Case. During his 
evaluation of the claim of the principle of non-discrimination to the status of ius cogens, he 
                                                
66 C.F.I., Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, T-306/01, 21 
Sept. 2005, §§ 292-293 and 343. 
C.F.I., Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, T-315/01, 21 Sept. 2005, §§ 241-242 and 288. 
See also: C.F.I., Chafiq Ayadi v. Council, T-253/02, 12 July 2006. 
C.F.I., Faraj Hassan v. Council and Commission, T-49/04, 12 July 2006. 
67 See, among others: P. ALSTON and B. SIMMA, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Ius Cogens, 
and General Principles”, Australian Yearbook of International Law, 1992, pp. 82-108, at pp. 103-107.  
H. MOSLER, The International Society as a Legal Community, o.c., p. 60. 
68 H.R. Committee, General Comment No 24 (52), o.c., § 8. 
69 I.-A.C.H.R., Michael Edwards et al. v. Bahamas, 4 Apr. 2001, 2000 Annual Report, No 48/01. 
70 I.-A.C.H.R., Vila-Masot v. Venezuela, 12 Oct. 1998, 1998 Annual Report, No 87/98, §§ 4 and 21. 
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extends it to all other human rights. In consequence, he considers that human rights “are not 
the product of a particular juridical system in the hierarchy of the legal order, but the same 
human rights must be recognised, respected and protected everywhere man goes”. Then, he 
adds that “the existence of human rights does not depend on the will of the state”. To be sure, 
“a state or states are not capable of creating human rights”. On the contrary, “they can only 
confirm their existence and give them protection”. As a result, “the role of the state is no more 
than declaratory”.71 Moreover, in the Nicaragua Case, the Court goes into the same direction, 
although without expressly mentioning the notion of ius cogens. And it points out that the 
inexistence of any conventional engagement for a country’s public authorities to respect 
human rights does not mean that this state can violate individual rights with impunity.72 This 
indicates that the Court gives to general international human rights law as a whole a 
peremptory status or, at the very least, a customary character. 
 
V. The consequences of this new conception of normativity for the protection of 
individual rights 
 
The crystallisation of this developing tendency and the recognition by the International 
Law Commission of the fact that all human rights belong to ius cogens bears a capital 
importance in practical terms. Indeed, the peremptory norms of general international law or 
rules of ius cogens are specifically defined in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties as norms “accepted and recognised by the international community of 
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”. This 
prohibition of any possibility for states to depart from the rules of ius cogens, even through a 
bilateral or multilateral treaty binding the sole parties to this agreement, constitutes their 
superiority in comparison with provisions of ius dispositivum.73  
 
As a result of this, treaties which conflict with peremptory norms of international law 
already existing at the time of their conclusion are void, while the emergence of new 
peremptory norms invalidates and terminates all conflicting treaties previously adopted. 
Indeed, “the basic characteristic of a ius cogens rule is that, as a source of law in the now 
                                                
71 I.C.J., South West Africa, 18 July 1966, TANAKA, Dissenting Opinion, pp. 295-298. 
72 I.C.J., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, 27 June 1986, p. 134, § 267. 
73 A. DE HOOGH, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes, o.c., p. 45. 
J. SZTUCKI, Ius Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Springer, 1974, p. 68. 
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vertical international legal system, it overrides any other rule which does not have the same 
status”. So, “in the event of a conflict between a ius cogens rule and any other rule of 
international law, the former prevails”, with the result that “the conflicting rule is null and 
void, or, in any event, does not produce legal effects which are in contradiction with the 
content of the peremptory rule”.74 In consequence, ius cogens norms introduce a hierarchy 
among international norms and serve as criteria both for the validity of other legal rules and 
for the legality of states’ acts.75 
 
Moreover, according to the legal stance expressed in Article 44 § 5 of the Vienna 
Convention, it seems that invalidation of a treaty in reason of its Article 53 -that is, for 
inconsistency with a peremptory rule of international law- affects its entirety and not merely 
the inconsistent clause. Yet, annulling the sole conflicting dispositions appears preferable 
where they can be severed from the rest of the agreement and that the aim of the latter does 
not contradict any peremptory norm. And, the International Law Commission allows the 
parties to revise themselves the endangered treaty to bring it in line with ius cogens and 
salvage it from nullity.76 Accessorily, most of the rules of ius cogens that were proposed by 
national delegations during the drafting of the Vienna Convention have a customary origin,77 
even if their primary position in the structure of the international system let them escape the 
hazards of states’ fluctuating practice.78 But some of them can also derive from treaties, 
general principles of international law, or United Nations resolutions.  
 
Anyhow, the wording of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts results in banning any treaty abolishing or negatively affecting 
international human rights law -be it under the cover of reservations- and in rendering these 
norms indistinguishably applicable in peace and wartime, as well as absolutely non-derogable 
in cases of state of emergency. This is an important departure from the ordinary rules 
governing other treaty provisions and international customs. Indeed, although they cannot be 
                                                
74 E.C.H.R., Al-Adsani v. UK, 21 Nov. 2001, L. CAFLISCH et al., Joint Dissenting Opinion, §§ 1 and 3. 
75 P.M. DUPUY, Droit international public, 8th ed., o.c., p. 296. 
P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, o.c., pp. 273, 281, 299-302, 306, 393-394 and 400. 
76 International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its 15th Session, 1963, UN Doc., A/5509, p. 199. 
77 C.L. ROZAKIS, The Concept of Ius Cogens in the Law of Treaties, o.c., p. 66. 
See also, on the uncertainty surrounding the sources of ius cogens norms: 
M. BYERS, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 187-
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78 P.-M. DUPUY, L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, pp. 223-224 and 397. 
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the objects of any reservation,79 some derogation can normally be taken from customary rules 
and states can contract treaties derogating from some of these norms in their bilateral 
relations.80 Conversely, human rights instruments are, now, legally immunised against such 
common dangers. 
 
As a corollary of their erga omnes and ius cogens character, their appertaining to an 
international public order and the ensuing actio popularis against domestic attacks on the 
liberties they protect, individual rights and freedoms are excluded -in the limits of their 
enactment in international agreements and customary law- from the powers of domestic 
authorities.81 By definition, international human rights and humanitarian norms can, therefore, 
never be legitimately or validly subjected to states’ assaults. In the end, they are legally 
removed from the scope of state sovereignty; they take precedent over it and curtail its 
legitimate scope. Essentially, they constitute both the foundation and the keystone of a 
transfer of the ultimate sovereignty to the international community, to the detriment of the 
powers and competences of its member states.  
 
On the basis of their privileged position, it has been argued that “the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not and cannot apply in quite the same manner to the 
interpretation of human rights treaties as it does to ordinary treaties” and that “autonomous 
rules may have to be developed for the interpretation of human rights instruments”.82 This 
being said, a departure from the dispositions of the Vienna Convention is not even necessary 
to ground a restrained conception of state sovereignty and the absolute priority of individual 
entitlements over conflicting considerations. As mentioned above, Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention states that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”. The application of this principle of interpretation to the case in hand 
permits to bypass the question of the need to construct an alternative set of secondary rules to 
                                                
79 I.C.J., North Sea Continental Shelf, Merits, 20 Feb. 1969, pp. 38-39; PADILLA NERVO, Separate Opinion, 
p. 97; TANAKA, Dissenting Opinion. 
80 G. FITZMAURICE, “Third Report on the Law of Treaties”, Yearbook of the ILC, 1958, Vol. II, p. 27. 
H. LAUTERPACHT, “Report”, o.c., p. 155. 
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81 J. KOLASA, “Rules on Emergency Powers in International Human Rights Treaties”, o.c., p. 110. 
D. TÜRK, “Reflections on Human Rights, Sovereignty of States and the Principle of Non-Intervention”, in 
Mélanges Eide, o.c., pp. 753-766, at pp. 757-758 and 765-766. 
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deal with fundamental rights. To sum up, Article 31 provides a textual justification for taking 
into consideration the particular aim and specific position of human rights instruments, when 
interpreting them. This motivates, in turn, the adoption of distinct solutions in practical 
instances, without departing from the frame of the Vienna Convention. 
 
The International Law Association draws the consequences of these developments 
until their logical conclusions and, eventually, completely dissociates human rights from 
states powers and undertakings. It remarks that fundamental rights “are no longer the reverse 
side of laws, their mirror image, as it were”; that is to say, that they “must still exist even if all 
states with their statutes and laws were to collapse”.83 Incidentally, this pronouncement is 
confirmed by the Preamble to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, whose 
second paragraph specifies that “the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a 
national of a certain state” and that “they therefore justify international protection in the form 
of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of 
the American states”. Thus, “since they are not derived from the state or any other external 
authority, they may not be taken away by any authority”.84 Similarly, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights considers that “human rights must be respected and guaranteed by all 
states”. And it justifies this stance by an appeal to the fact that they are “superior to the power 
of the state, whatever its political structure”.85 In a nutshell, individuals hold basic rights 
because of their humanity and not due to some legal tie with the country of which they are 
nationals. Therefore, they owe everything to themselves and nothing to the state.86 
 
This type of approach is often criticised as the expression of a natural law conception 
and generally discarded as such. However, the primacy of individual freedom over public 
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interests and the general welfare, the obligation for states parties to the United Nations to 
respect fundamental rights independent of further agreement on their part, and the 
international protection of those basic entitlements in all instances, are not mainly rooted in 
natural rights and their correlative duties. They are, on the contrary, integral components of 
the international legal order as it stands today; and their affirmation is nothing but positivistic. 
In fact, they simply refer to the existence, in positive international law, of peremptory norms -
namely, ius cogens obligations, which are undoubtedly a part of the current legal order at the 
international level- and to states’ duties towards the international community, as distinct from 
the sum of all states that belong to it.87 This is inherent to the fact that the international arena 
is not restricted anymore to a select club of states, but composed of a wide array of public and 
private actors, whose conflicting claims need to be protected globally.  
 
VI. The function of human rights in the structuring of a new universal space of 
normativity 
 
The distinctive role played by human rights treaties and their specific functions imply 
that these instruments can never admit clauses limiting the scope or application of their 
provisions for contradictory purposes. As a result, restrictions to these norms can solely be 
permitted where this is done with the clear and incontestable aim of guaranteeing and 
enhancing the protection of individual rights. This contention is supported by the particular 
position occupied by fundamental rights in the general structure of the international system 
and favours a vision of international sovereignty residing in the international community as a 
whole and constructed around the protection of individual entitlements, over its ‘political’ 
state-based Westphalian counter-part. Under this new paradigm, the international society 
becomes the first guarantor of fundamental liberties. Consequently, at the international level, 
the possibility emerges for unmediated individual claims addressed directly to the 
international community, independent of any grounding in the nation-state. And, in due 
course, we end up with a radically cosmopolitan model for the global society.  
 
Bearing in mind the notoriously poor record of state organs and public officials, 
whenever they are given the opportunity to deal with such private actors as they wish to, the 
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rights and interests of those new international subjects are clearly better protected before 
supra-national institutions. Accordingly, the international supervision of the respect of human 
rights and the presence of international mechanisms facilitating the defence of individuals 
against the national establishment, which is exercising power over them, are answering to an 
imperative need of the international community.88 To be sure, abandoning the protection of 
human rights to domestic authorities, which are the prime violators of individual freedom,89 is 
obviously inadequate, if not entirely dangerous. Seeing the prominent place given to 
fundamental rights and more generally to individual concerns in contemporary international 
law, this had to be remedied one way or another. In consequence, international law and the 
international society are entrusted with a twofold role as guardians of humanitarian norms and 
obstacles to states’ misdeeds. The role of supervising the respect of these fundamental 
freedoms and entitlements is ultimately entrusted to the whole international community; that 
is, all subjects of public international law in their capacity of trans-national actors and subjects 
of a cosmopolitan legal order. The enforcement of these norms is, accordingly, equally 
entrusted to the entire international community; more specifically, to domestic courts and 
tribunals in first instance and with an appeal before international monitoring bodies.  
 
Through the recognition of their legal prevalence in supra-national documents, 
fundamental rights are actually providing the conceptual linkage between liberalism and 
contemporary developments in international law; leading to a new concept of liberal 
sovereignty, where states “sovereignty is not absolute and includes respect for its legal 
limitations”.90 Incontestably, “sovereignty is only a name given to so much of the international 
field as is left by law to the individual action of states”.91 In the first place, states’ pretensions 
to sovereignty rest, at the international level, on the recognition of this principle in the Charter 
of the United Nations. As a result, national sovereignty is only appropriate so long as states 
act inside the limits established by the Charter and respect the norms it protects. This includes, 
above all, the rights of individuals living under their jurisdiction. In consequence, domestic 
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authorities lose their sovereign control when they are implicated in human rights violations, as 
the commission of such abuses is clearly outside the limits of the dominion that the Charter 
concedes to them. Therefore, rights are the principal channel of the contemporary shift from a 
traditionalist archetype of state sovereignty to a paradigm of liberal international or 
cosmopolitan sovereignty, which seeks to curtail political power and render it accountable by 
placing “at its centre the primacy of individual human beings”.92 
 
As such, rights determine the limits of law’s legitimacy and the democratic character 
of the polity. They “serve as constraints on which institutions we should have”93 and as 
standards of legality of municipal organs. A legitimate state is a rights-respecting state, and 
democratic institutions are institutions protective of basic rights. Accordingly, just institutions, 
both at the trans-national and at the municipal level, emerge from the antecedent rights of 
individuals. This inverts the conventional republican conception, where fundamental liberties 
materialise as the result of the adoption of traditional democratic principles or the 
institutionalisation of the general will. Indeed, the entrenchment of basic rights in 
constitutional documents, international treaties and customs becomes the corner-stone of 
states’ legitimacy. Subsequently, legal norms and decisions that ostensibly infringe 
fundamental rights need not only to be considered unjust but also invalid. In a nutshell, human 
rights constitute at the same time constraints on the individual actions of every agent and 
standards for the evaluation of the legitimacy of political structures and the validity of laws.  
 
In this new perspective, human rights constitute a sort of Hartian ‘rule of recognition’ 
of the international legal order; namely, they serve as criteria for the validity at the supra-
national level of each and every legal provision otherwise adopted. Herbert Hart defines a rule 
of recognition as “a very simple form of secondary rule: a rule for conclusive identification of 
the primary rules of obligation”. It is normally concerned with conferring powers but it can, 
nevertheless, include substantive and even moral conditions. It unifies all other norms into a 
coherent legal system. And it operates as a benchmark for their validity. Therefore, it 
constitutes the defining element and the ultimate foundation of the entire legal order. Hart 
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adds that “for the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in 
the way in which particular rules are identified”, in practice, by various actors, chiefly 
including judicial bodies. This entails a clearly customary aspect.  
 
Besides, the validity of that particular rule does not need to be demonstrated. In spite 
of the fact that it serves as a touchstone for the validity of all other rules within a given legal 
order, it cannot (logically) ground either its own legitimacy or that of the system as a whole. 
These two issues are clearly interdependent but they require some further justification, as well 
as an extra-legal point of reference from which to assess their truthfulness. Yet, as long as one 
remains inside the legal paradigm, the rule of recognition functions as a factor of self-
validation and rationalisation of that regime. Hence, Hart’s rule of recognition is, at the same 
time, a norm and a blunt fact. It also has both a legal and a meta-legal character. In a way, it is 
axiomatic precisely because it is the keystone of the system, the main hypothesis on which it 
is constructed and from which it derives its internal consistency.94  
 
This is precisely the role played by human rights on the international plane. Their ius 
cogens status does not merely give them a peremptory character but implies also that no treaty 
can restrict or oppose them. This means that they work in practice as a standard for the 
legality of other norms, which is the nature and function Hart ascribes to his rule of 
recognition. Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights considers that domestic rules 
and policies which violate basic human rights cannot qualify as the law, at least for the 
purposes of the Convention.95 Moreover, as part of the wider set of ius cogens norms, they 
have a customary character at the international level. And the progressive strengthening of 
their effective recognition and protection has been tightly linked to the development of 
international customs. Further, although not always explicitly articulated, their impact on the 
pronouncements of international courts, supervisory organs and other institutions is 
undoubtedly decisive. They are posited as the core of the recently emerging international 
public order and the principal justification for the post-Westphalian shift from traditional 
states’ sovereignty to a new conception of sovereignty, residing in the international 
community, as the guarantor of universal principles and the protector of individual 
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entitlements. In consequence, they constitute the perfect illustration of the materialisation of 
the international legal integration process through a normative hierarchy and of a universal, 
extra-territorial and quasi-objective, substantive law; hence, embodying a radically novel 
conception of normative space and normativity. 
